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THE :t-P.OBLEf1 IN GE?l1ANY 
The problem which confronts us in Germany is a segment 
of the world-wide problem of establishing equitable, rational and 
evolving, conditions of peace. Today the crisis looms in a di-
vided Germany and a divided Berlin. Tomorro't'T the scene of princi-
pal danger may shift to the Hiddle East. The day after it could 
be in the Far East that the clouds of conflict gather. 
Since the end of the second war we have lived l'lith a 
succession of international crises in these and other regions 
of the globe. It is as though the world were a vast and danger-
ous mine. We have rushed from one point of imminent or actual 
cave-in to another in a never-ending struggle to shore up the 
sagging roof of peace. He have timbered t-1ith a Berlin airlift, 
with a military defense of South Korea, with vast aid-programs 
in Europe, Asia and elset·There, to~ith troops in Lebanon and with 
naval p0\'7er and other measures in the Formosan Straits. 
These costly and strenuous improvisations represent 
our efforts to prevent a complete collapse of peace. It is 
doubtful, however, that what these measures have produced in 
the principal zones of danger--in Germany and Central Europe, 
in the Middle East and in Asia--this patcht-1orlc of timbering on 
~1hich the fate of civilization rests--t-lould meet a minimum 
safety code. The fact is that a dangerous world, no less than 
a dangerous mine, is not made safer, in any permanent sense, by 
patchwork. Improvisations may be unavoidable, as interim meas-
ures, as desperate measures. They ought not to be confused, 
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however, with peace. Cn the contrary, improvisations may con-
ceal an encroaching danger to ourselves and to the rest of the 
~~orld by creating the illusion of stability, by permitting the 
postponement of essential, fundamental changes until it becomes 
perilously late to make them. 
Something of that sort, I believe, lies at the root 
of the present problem :..n Ge~"'ttlany. For years nO't'l, there has 
existed in that nation a kind of surface stability. 
This is the appearance of that stability. In Uestern 
Germany 't1hich houses about SO million Germans, the responsible, 
representative government of the Federal Republic, its capital 
in the city of Bonn,funct~ons with a high degree of effective-
ness. West Germany has one of the most productive and dynamic 
industrial economies in the ~'lorld . It also has the substantial 
beginnings of a pm·1erful German military establishment. Beside 
this establishment, there are garrisoned over 275,000 other NATO 
troops--French, Br~tish and American--many with their dependents. 
To the East of the Federal Republic is a communist-
held German territory, much smaller in area and with a popula-
tion of only 17 millions. Many Germans regard this region not 
as East Germany but as Central Germany, having in mind the Polish-
annexed territories beyond the Oder-Neisse as the true, the un-
redeemed East. For our purposes tonight, ho~.o1ever, I shall speak 
of the region as East Germany or Communist Germany. In this 
sector of the divided nation, there is poverty, stagnation and 
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oppression from which vast numbers have fled to the Pest in 
recent years. Increasingly, however, we hear reports of plans, 
if not the beginning, of an economic revival in the East. 
There is communist rule in Eastern Germany. A 
German totalitarian regime exists there by virtue of its own 
and Soviet po't'Ter and the acquiescence, ho'ttlever sullen, of the 
East German people. As in the Hest, a German military establish-
ment has been reconstituted in the East, under communist control. 
It is supplemented by many divisions of Soviet Russian troops. 
This brief sketch of a divided Germany also fits in 
microcosm, with some variations, the present situation in a 
divided Berlin. A principal difference is that Allied and 
Soviet Russian forces still retain tangible, visible responsi-
bility for what happens, respectively, in the Hestern and East-
ern sectors of the city. Garrisons of both are present and the 
Russians control the routes through East Germany over which 
French, British and American forces must pass, from their bases 
in Hest Germany to their outpost in Berlin. 
Under the ultimate control of the Allies, Hest Berlin 
has its o'tm municipal govel.'llment 't'lith trTillie Brandt as its able, 
outspoken Hayor. Under Soviet control, a sector of East Berlin--
Pankow--serves as the seat of the Communist East German regime. 
P..mong Germans of the t~'lo zones of the divided nation 
and the blo parts of Berlin there is a considerable contact, 
official and unofficial, in trade and in other matters. There 
is no formal recognition, however, of the one by the other. In 
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fact, of all the pri nci pal countries involved i n ti1e Ge::man 
situation only the Sovi et Union recognizes both the \-Jest and 
East German governments. 
That, in bri ef, i s the look of stabi lity i n Germany. 
,•' 
The arrangements which underp~n this stability are t hose which 
evolved at the end of vJorld l•Jar II. They were des i gned origi-
nally for the temporary occupation of a defeated Germany. But 
what began as an expedi ent took on a ki nd of permanence with 
the breakdown in relations bett·reen the Soviet Uni on and t he 
Western nations. 
All around the r im of Germany changes have taken 
place. vJithi n Hest Germany and East Germany, respecti vely, 
changes have also taken place. But bet'\'leen the div i s i ons, the 
arrangements for stabi l i ty have not changed i n essentials for 
years. 
All of the nati ons i nvolved have recogni zed at one 
t i me or another that these arrangements are i nadequate. He 
and other Hestern nati ons have sai d, i n effect, that they must 
be changed. The Soviet Union has admitted that they should be 
changed. The German leaders-- East and t~Jest--knmv that sooner or 
later they ~1ill be changed . All i nvolved have paid at least lip 
service to the bas i c requi rements of change, that is, to the need 
for reuni ficat i on of Germany and of i ts capital of Berli n and to 
the need for a final liqui dati on of '(IJorld vJar II. 
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However, no nation has really moved from the pos i tion 
it assumed years ago on how these admi ttedly necessary changes 
should be brought about. The Hestern position has been based) 
at least until recently, on the contention that there should be 
free all-German elections as the prerequisite to reuni fication 
and a peace settlement. The Russians have been vague on this 
matter but it is apparent that even if they use the same language 
as we do, they do not mean the same thi ngs. They clearly do not 
accept a unification of Germany by free all-German elections, if 
it means, as it 't'Tould at this time, the obliteration of German 
communist political influence in East Germany. It may be that 
they are not really prepared to accept unificati on under any 
circumstances unless it means the dominati on of all of Germany 
by communism. 
In the meantime, all have managed to live with the 
existi ng arrangements, wi th a di vided Germany and Berlin, part 
free and part communist, with a Germany no longer at war but 
not yet fully at peace. On only two occasions have these arrange-
ments been seriously challenged. They were h i t by the Stalin-
imposed blockade of Berlin ::n 1948. Then, i n 1953, the com-
munist political structure i n East Germany was shaken by worker 
uprisings. Both attempts, as you know, failed. The vJestern 
nations committed enormous resources in the Berli n airli ft and 
in the supply and reconstruction of West Berlin. Finally, 
Stalin ~·Tas persuaded to abandon hi s attempt to force us from 
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the city and to unify it under communist control. The East 
German revolt which we supported with very articulate enthusiasm 
was suppressed by Soviet military power and the hope of a spon-
taneous unification of all Germany under freedom, in that fash-
ion, 'tias set back. 
Si nce 1953, the status quo has not again been sub-
jected to a major test anywhere in Germany. To be sure, there 
have been incidents which have sent tremors through the stability 
but they did not upset it. Just last November, for example, Mr. 
Khrushchev warned that he tiould change the status quo at Berlin. 
He did not schedule the execution of the change, however, until 
this month. Now, apparently, it has been postponed, pending the 
results of the coming conferences. 
In short, the German s i tuation is sti ll held together 
by the same provisional, improvised arrangements which have held 
it together for years. These arrangements are tied to certain 
basic conditions, conditi ons which must prevail if the stability 
in Germany, in its present form, is to continue. He must see 
clearly what these cond~ions are if we are to measure the scope 
of the problem which confronts us. Let me, the"Lefore, outline 
them at this point. 
First, the present stabi lity in Germany depends upon 
the absence of decisive accidents or provocat i ons between the 
military forces of the vlest and the Soviet Union. It is conceiv-
able that there may be hostile or threatening contact between 
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these forces, as i ndeed there has been, l7i thout a col lapse. 
This contact, however, cannot go too far. At some undetermined 
point, mi litary accidents or provocations are l i kely to set off 
a chain reaction which ~Till engage i.n a decisive fashion the 
prestige--the face, so to speak--of the princi pal pott7ers. At 
that point the irrevocabl e slide or plunge i nto the abyss of 
war ~rlll have begun. 
That, then, is one condition of the conti nuance of 
the status quo in Germany, of the present stability which is 
nei ther peace nor \'lar. There must be an absence of hostile 
accidents or provocations between the military forces in Germany 
which go beyond the poi nt of no return. 
The second condition is German acquiescence, the 
acqui escence of the people of the East as well as the West in 
the systems under whi ch they nov1 l i ve. Let me say, parentheti-
cally at thi s poi nt that I do not suggest that this i s desirable. 
I merely say that it is one of the factors which underlie the 
existing stability ~ 
As a part of acguiescence 2 Germans must be willing 
to accept the conti nued di v i sion of their country, the continued 
presence of foreign troops in great numbers in their land and 
the military arrangements whi ch join one segment of the nation 
to NATO for protection and subordinate the other to the t>Iarsaw 
Pact. 
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The third basic condition of ~he ~tatus quo is that 
the Hestem powers and the Soviet Union must also tolerate the 
existing div~sion of Germany and the present arrangements for 
occupation of a divided Berlin. In short, if the German people 
must accept the status quo, the T·!estem Pm·1ers and the Soviet 
Union must not challenge it, at least they must not challenge 
it with anything much stronger than words. Further, the peoples 
of the l•Jest must be prepared, as must the people of the communist 
bloc to pay the ever-increasing costs of defense establishments 
and the instruments of cold war which are made necessary in part 
by the existing arrangements for keeping the status quo in Germany. 
In stating these conditions, I emphasize again that I 
do not advocate them or subscribe to their desirability. I 
merely note them as underlying the present situation in Germany, 
as the conditions precedent to its continuance. These conditions 
are not the foundations of an equitable, rational and evolving 
peace in Germany and Central Europe. They are the patchwork 
timbering of an improvised truce. Nevertheless, they are the 
conditions on which the lives of the German people, the people 
of Europe and, in a larger sense, the survival of a recognizable 
human civilization not-1 depend. 
If one of these conditions is changed in any signifi-
cant fashion, I cannot see that the present situation in Germany 
is likely to persist. It seems to me that it must either evolve 
into something more durable or it will collapse ;n the chaos of 
of war, limited or unlimited. 
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Putting as ide for a moment r1r. Khrushchev's announce-
ment that he proposes to alter one of the conditions of the pre-
sent stability, that is, the arrangement at Berlin, what of 
others? Can these others, in any event, be counted upon to sup-
port indefinitely the e~dsting situation? I do not see how they 
can be. I believe that these other conditions have already 
changed markedly beneath the surface calm, that they are continu-
ing to change and that they cannot change much more before the 
churning shall break through the surface. 
In that sense, I am persuaded that the present stabil-
ity in Germany t-tas in the process of erosion long before 1'1r. 
~1rushchev's announcement last November. Indeed, I said so in 
the Senate many months prior to that time. 
Let us look for a moment at the present state of these 
conditione of stabil:1.ty, these basic conditions which must pre-
vail if there is to be no change in the German situation. Take 
the first--that there must be no mi litaEY acc~dent or provocation 
in Germany which goes beyond the point of no return. It ~s 
obvious that none, so far, has done so. But there have been 
grave near-misses. The Berlin Blockade was a massive near-miss. 
Since that time there have been other incidents, provocat~ons. 
I need not catalogue them. You have seen reference to them time 
and a~ain--to the buzzed transports, to the challenged convoys, 
to the downed planes and the detained soldiers. ! do not know 
which of these incidents may have been prompted by higher Soviet 
headquarters and which may have come about by the whim of some 
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local commander. Given a concucive se~_ ?f circumstances~?~ 
ever, it is far from inconcei vable that any ~nc~dent of this 
k:.ncl mi.ght go out of control. 
Apart from deli berate provocation, the~e sti.ll remains 
the very real danger of military accident, if not on our £art, 
then on tDeirs. The chances of accident multiply when forces 
are poised--as they are in Germany--at swords-point and are 
keyed tight by the electrified atmosphere of cold war, of propa-
ganda war. They multiply agai n as the countdowns of the new 
weapons quicken and their delivery times shorten. They multiply 
sti ll agai n as these devices of incredible devastation find their 
way into more and more hands. In this sense 1 then 1 a basic pre-
condition of the status guo i n Germany has indeed changed, quite 
apart from any recent change in Soviet policy wi th respect to 
Berlin. It has changed in the sense that the margin for mili-
tary error or provocation has narrowed. The prospects are 1 
moreover, that the margi n will narrm-1 still further as time goes 
I believe, too, that it i s reasonable to suggest that 
the acqui escence of the Germans--East and West--the second basic 
condition on which the status quo rests, has also changed signi-
ficantly and will continue to change. It is, of course, diffi-
cult to document the sentiment of a 1;-1hole people. He are in-
formed, ho~1ever, that there is great une:Kpressed discontent in 
East Germany. We know, moreover, that there are movements for 
reunification and neutralization in Western Germany, even if we 
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cannot measure their strength. He must assume that curxents of a 
similar and probably stronger kind flow through East Germany even 
though Mr. Gallup has yet to conduct a poll in that region. 
It is obvious that the defeated Germany, the disarmed 
Germany, the shattered, starving Germany for which the present 
improvised arrangements of stability t'lere devised, no longer 
exists. As I noted earlier in my remarks, at least in one zone--
in the West--there is a revitalized nation. Furthe~~ore, in both 
zones, there now exist German military forces and political struc-
tures manned by Germans, even if, in the East, they may not be 
controlled ultimately by Germans. In both zones, finally, a new 
generation is coming into its own--a generation which w·as young 
in the days of defeat but which, now and in the years immediately 
ahead, will inevitably rise to leadership in Germany. In these 
circumstances, it would be unrealistic in the extreme to believe 
that the arrangements for stability which exist in Germany--de-
vised in another hour and for another setting and modified only 
within each zone separately--will continue to serve for the in-
definite future. In short, we must face the likelihood that the 
second condition of the status quo--the continued acquiescence 
of the German people in division and quasi-occupation may well 
be dra~ling to an end. lrJe must reckon with the strong possibility 
that, increasingly, Germans will seek their unity and national 
e~uality by whatever means may be available if constructive ma-
chinery to facilitate it in peace and order does not exist. 
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As for the third basic condi tion on 't·Jh ~ c'1 t!1e ..E,_resent 
stability in Germany rests, I have already noted that if 'tole are 
to go on as we are, the Western nations and the Soviet Union 
must not challenge the exi sting arrangements with anything much 
ocs:asional 
stronger than 't'lords. In fact, except fog dangerous but limited 
military incidents and provocations, neither has challenged it, 
in any other fashion in recent years. Further I said that both 
the people of the Hestern nations and the Soviet Union must be 
willing to pay the ever-increasing costs of defense establish-
ments and the instruments of cold war to keep a rough eq_uilibrium 
of force not only in Germany but throughout the world. That, 
too, has been done until now, although I 't·lOuld be less than 
honest if I did not e~press my deep concern over continuing re-
ports that the Soviet effort in this respect is greater than our 
~· I am not in a pos i t ion to evaluate those reports. The of-
ficial secrecy--necessary and unnecessary--which engulfs this 
question cannot be easily penetrated by Members of Congress. 
The disqui eting reports, hm·1ever ~ come from highly qualified 
and competent sources and they do not auger well for the future. 
They certai nly raise doubts about the likeli hood of maintaining 
the present stability in Germany or an~~here else for that matter. 
Finally, the third condi tion of the status quo also 
depends upon the maintenance of the present arrangements at 
Berlin. vJe now know that these arrangements have been challenged. 
Mr. Khrushchev has assailed the Western pos i tion i n Berlin and 
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demanded that it change. He has done so, hm-1ever, only in words 
and, in that respect, his challenge is not new. 
tfuat is new, what does threaten the status quo is the 
strange action by which Mro I<hrushchev proposes to bring about 
this change. He proposes to withdraw himself from Berlin, that 
is, he says that he will remove Soviet forces from the city and 
from the routes of access to it. Our official answer has been 
equally strange. We have said, in effect, that the Russians 
cannot leave the city and the routes of access, that they cer-
tainly cannot leave it in spirit and perhaQS not even in body. 
After trying for many years to get the Russians out of the areas 
into which they sprat·lled after Horld 'tt1ar II, here is one place 
that we do not wish them to leave. 
The reason for this is clear. If the Russians do quit 
Berlin, they will turn over the inst~~ents of control to East 
German communists. That opens, for the Soviet Union, a large 
field of manoeuvre in the war of nerves. But in a more funda-
mental sense, the action will also work a change in the under-
lying conditions of the status quo in Germany. It will increase 
the strains and stresses on the essential military restraints 
which are a part of the present stabi l i ty. It will do the same 
to German acquiescence which is also a part of i t. In short, 
the entire German situation will move into a peri od of grave 
instability out of t'lhich is likely to emerge either a new status 
quo or conflict. 
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There has been a great deal of speculat:'.Oi.l on "1hy 
Mr . Khrushchev has threatened to ta!<e th~s step . Cne may as-
sume, of course, that Mr . :<hrushchev has been motivated by what 
he believes 't·lill be ultimately to the advantage of the Soviet 
Union and world communism. ! would hope that we are equally 
motivated by what ~~e believe to be to the advantage of the 
United St attes and to "t'lorld freedom. 
~fuat is significant at this moment, is not so much 
the ultimate aims of Soviet communism. He know what they are 
and it is of little value to i ntone them again and again as 
though this litany will somehow protect us from them. Here 
significant is the question of hm·7 t1r. l<hrushchev proposes to 
serve communist interests through Soviet policies at a moment 
in history ~1hen the transcendent interests of civilization, and 
of the human species i tself, rest in delicate balance be~-1een 
survival and nuclear obl~teration. 
No one who is not pr::vy to the operations of Nr. 
r<hrushchev 1 s mind and the inner 't·mrldng of the mach:!.nery of 
Soviet communism can be certain of what U.es beneath the Soviet 
manoeuvre at Berlin. The move could have been motivated by a 
combinat::on of any of a score of reasons, some logi cal, some 
" 11 . 1 • d • 1" d 1. og:~.ca_, some grop2.ng tm-1ar s peace, some stumo :...ng towar s 
war. 
The interpretation of the charades of Sov::et policy 
may be a fascinating game. As I have already noted, however, 
this game ::s essenti ally speculative. tfua t seems to ~e most 
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important at this point :!.s not to guess at t he o~nci.:.i:e con-tents 
of the Soviet mi nd but rather to get clearly ~n our o~m minds 
'1:·7hat it is that 't'le--the lr!es tern nati ons--seek i n this situat:f.on. 
tfuat is most important is to make certai n that \·7~1at 't'le seek is 
reasonably related to the situation that e~cis ts i n Germany to-
day, not to one ~1hich 't-7e woulc. 1~1~e to exis t or one v-1h:!.ch may 
have ex~sted years ago and no longer exists. 
If the interests of this nation, of freedom and of 
human c i vilization lay only i n maintaining ex~sting arrangements 
i n Germany, if Mr . l<hrushchev's manoeuvre at Berli n were the only 
t hreat to these arrangements then, i ndeed, it ~10uld be sufficient 
to counter that manoeuv.ce merely by 11standing finn.:. 
Is that, however, the case? I think it is clear that 
f'lr . I<hrushchev 1 s manoeuv.ce at Berli n is not the only danger to 
the status quo in Germany. Further, I question "t>Thether an ef-
fort to maintain that status quo i ndefi nitely is , in fact, in 
accord wita the interests of t his nation, freecom and human 
c i vilization. 
To be sure, "t'le shall "stand firm" at Berl:~.n and i n 
Germany. I know of no responsible person in the government of 
this nation who holds othe~~ise. I certainly do not hold other-
wise. Horeover, I lmm~ of no statesman in the Hes tern world 
who holds otherwise. We shall stand firm because to permit 
the forces of freedom to be frightened, cajoled or driven from 
Berlin--the future capital of all Germany--will be to remove 
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one of the props of the p~esent stability in that country before 
another firmer support is in place. Let us not, hm.,.ever, con-
fuse the necessity for standing firm i n that sense with a mere 
maintenance of present arrangements in Germany for the inde-
finite future. 
I am not persuaded that the interests of this nation, 
of freedom and of human civilization l~e in an indefinite con-
tinuance of the present military situation in Berlin and in 
Germany, a situation which, increasingly, will permit an accident 
or an irresponsible local provocation to precipitate the suicide 
of civilization. I am not persuaded that these interests are 
served by perpetuating arrangements in Germany which offer lit-
tle prospect of progress tm-1ards peaceful unification to the 
German people. I am not persuaded that these interests are 
served by the ever-mounting costs of the arms rivalry of the 
cold 't'lar, and the propaganda 't'lar- -costs t-lhich are occasioned in 
great part by the existing situation in Germany. 
:fuat I am trying to suggest, in short, is that it is 
not enough, in ou~ own interests, merely to stand fast in Ger-
many, as an end in itself . It :i.s not enough merely to seek to 
sustain an existing situation which is ceasing to be adequate 
for minimum stability in Germany and Central Europe. Rather, 
we must stand fast in order to go forward, in order to establish 
more equi table, rational and evolving conditions of peace. 
That is the challenge of the impendi ng conferences on 
Germany. We must strive in them, it seems to me, to create a 
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less volatile situation in Berlin, not merely by changi?g the 
Western position in that city as the Russians have suggested 
but perhaps by altering the status of the entire city, by inter-
nationalizing all Berlin under United Nations or other satisfac-
tory international auspices as an interim arrangement. We must 
seek a readjustment of the military situation in all of Germany 
and Central Europe in a fashion which promises to reduce the 
danger of war by accident or provocation. vle must seek, finally, 
full 
a beginning on the spread o~political freedom throughout Ger-
many and on German unification and, to that end, we must enlist 
in far greater measure than heretofore, the participation of the 
Germans themselves--East and t·1est. 
I realize, fully, that 'tie shall not get an~1here ~-1ith 
negct~ations to these ends if the ~ussians are not of a mind, 
in the~.r otm interest, to move :;.,n a similar direction. As I 
have said, I do not presume to ~tnow the contents of the Soviet 
mind at this time, nor do I lmm-1 of anyone who does . I do ltnow 
that regardless of Russian intentions we shall not begin to move 
towards these ends unless we ourselves are clear as to where it 
is we \'lant to go. He require at tl;.is point in t::.me, beyond all 
else, a frank recognition oi the importance of a change in Ger-
many, a chanze not in the manner expounded by the ~ussians and 
not necessar~ly in the manner first projected by ourselves years 
ago. Rather 2 we need a change which conforms to the realities 
of the present, a change brought about by concessions which match 
concessions. To this taslc, we--all the t·Jestern nations--must 
bring a new dedication, a new determination to develop equitable, 
durable and evolving conditions of peace. 
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